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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Michael Weston filed a sexual harassment civil 
action against his employer, the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections ("PDOC"), and Dolor es Merithew, a co- 
worker. Weston alleged violations of T itle VII, the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), and 
Pennsylvania common law. Weston's Title VII claim was 
premised on a hostile work environment theory. 
Specifically, Weston asserted that he was subjected to a 
hostile work environment as a result of the PDOC's failure 
to discipline Merithew after she had physically touched 
Weston on two occasions, and as a consequence of the 
comments, jokes and jibes made by employees and inmates 
who had learned of the incidents. In addition, Weston 
alleged that, after he complained to the PDOC about this 
harassment, the PDOC retaliated against him by 
reprimanding him and transferring him to a less desirable 
position. 
 
The District Court dismissed Weston's T itle VII claim for 
"hostile work environment" sexual harassment as well as 
his state common law claims against the PDOC for failure 
to state a claim. The District Court granted summary 
judgment to the PDOC on Weston's retaliation claim. After 
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a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment in favor 
of Weston and against Merithew on the r emaining state law 
claims. Weston timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
In this appeal, Weston challenges the District Court's 
disposition of both his hostile work environment claim and 
his retaliation claim. With respect to the hostile work 
environment claim, Weston asserts that it was error for the 
court to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as his 
complaint's allegations sufficed to make out a hostile work 
environment claim, particularly in light of the liberal notice 
pleading requirements contained in FED. R. CIV. P. 8. We 
decide that Weston's allegations concer ning the PDOC's 
response to the two incidents of physical touching were not 
adequate to state a Title VII hostile work environment 
claim, and we affirm the District Court's dismissal of that 
portion of Weston's complaint. However , we also conclude 
that Weston's allegations as to a hostile environment 
created as a result of the comments, jokes, and jibes made 
by co-workers and managers did meet the federal rules' 
liberal pleading requirements, and we ther efore reverse the 
District Court's dismissal of that component of W eston's 
hostile work environment claim, and remand for further 
discovery and proceedings. Finally, in r egard to Weston's 
averments as to a hostile environment cr eated as a result 
of verbal harassment on the part of inmates, while we agree 
with the District Court that those allegations, as they 
currently stand, do not suffice to state a T itle VII claim, we 
reverse the court's dismissal, and remand with instructions 
to grant Weston a specified period of time in which to 
amend (and amplify) that portion of his complaint. 
 
With respect to the retaliation claim, Weston avers that it 
was error for the court to grant summary judgment, 
because he succeeded in creating a genuine issue as to the 
material fact that the PDOC took adverse action against 
him, in the form of two written reprimands and two 
suspensions without pay, as a result of his harassment 
complaints. We conclude that, under the cir cumstances 
present in Weston's case, the written r eprimands do not 
constitute adverse employment actions. We further decide 
that Weston failed to present sufficient evidence to establish 
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the requisite causal connection between the two 
suspensions and his complaints. Accordingly, we affirm the 
District Court's summary judgment grant on the r etaliation 
claim. 
 
I. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Weston is a corrections officer at the State Correctional 
Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania. At the time of this 
action, he worked in the Food Services Department as a 
trainer. His duties included supervising inmates who 
worked in the prison's kitchen. Merithew is also a 
corrections officer and held a similar position in the prison 
kitchen. Although testimony indicates that W eston and 
Merithew did not have an amicable working relationship, on 
February 11, 1997, Merithew massaged Weston's back in 
the presence of inmates. Weston found this physical contact 
offensive and told Merithew to stop. Merithew laughed in 
response, but apparently discontinued the activity. 
 
Three days later, Weston tor e a visible hole in the seat of 
his pants. While his back was turned, Merithew placed her 
finger in the hole, touching his buttocks. As with the 
previous incident, this act occurred in the presence of 
inmates. Weston expressed his anger to Merithew and told 
her to leave him alone. 
 
Weston complained to his supervisor about Merithew's 
actions, and she was given a written reprimand. Weston 
claimed that, as a result of Merithew's actions, he was 
subjected to offensive comments, jibes, and jokes made by 
co-workers, managers and inmates. According to Weston, 
the PDOC did not act in response to his complaints. In fact, 
Weston was reprimanded by the PDOC and transferred to a 
less desirable position. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Weston sued both the PDOC and Merithew in the District 
Court. Weston alleged that the PDOC violated Title VII and 
the PHRA by failing to properly discipline Merithew after 
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Weston's complaints and that Weston was subjected to 
repeated jokes, jibes, and offensive comments by co- 
workers, managers and inmates. He also claimed that the 
PDOC retaliated against him for complaining about 
Merithew's conduct by reprimanding him and transferring 
him to a less desirable position. 
 
The PDOC first moved to dismiss Weston's complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 
See FED. R. CIV. P . 12(b)(6). On September 29, 1998, the 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss, in part. 
Specifically, the court determined that W eston's complaint 
failed to allege facts that showed the PDOC was negligent in 
disciplining Merithew, and it held that Weston failed to 
establish the PDOC's liability under respondeat superior. 
Further, the District Court found that the jokes and 
offensive comments Weston experienced after the incidents 
did not constitute a hostile working environment. However, 
the District Court denied the PDOC's motion to dismiss 
Weston's retaliation claim. 
 
After limited discovery, the PDOC moved for summary 
judgment on the remaining retaliation claim. Although 
Weston may have suffered adverse employment actions, the 
District Court held that he had not shown a causal 
connection between these actions and his complaints about 
Merithew's conduct. Even if he had established such a 
connection, the District Court suggested that the outcome 
would have been the same because the PDOC of fered a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In his response to the PDOC's motion to dismiss, Weston conceded 
that his state law claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotion distress were 
barred by sovereign immunity. Weston also abandoned his charge that 
his transfer to a less desirable position was a r etaliatory action by the 
PDOC. 
 
2. Weston also sued Merithew individually. The District Court held a 
bench trial on June 1, 1999, and found that Merithew had committed a 
battery under state law. On June 3, 1999, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of Weston and against Merithew and awarded 
compensatory damages in the amount of $1250.00. 
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II. Motion to Dismiss - The Hostile Work Environment 
       Claims 
 
We exercise plenary review when examining a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 
12(b)(6). Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F .3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 
1993). We accept the allegations of the complaint as true 
and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff. Id. We will affir m a dismissal only if it appears 
certain that a plaintiff will be unable to support his claim. 
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F .2d 271, 273 (3d 
Cir. 1985). Our review of Weston's complaint reveals two 
separate bases for hostile work environment sexual 
harassment -- one concerning the conduct and actions of 
the PDOC and Dolores Merithew and one concer ning 
unidentified "coworkers, managers and inmates." 
Complaint, P 18. 
 
A. Hostile Work Environment Claims 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act make it unlawful for an 
employer to "discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C.S 2000e-2(a)(1).3 
Hostile work environment harassment occurs when 
unwelcome sexual conduct unreasonably inter feres with a 
person's performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment. Meritor Savs. Bank FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986) 
(quoting 29 C.F.R. S 1604.11(a)(3)). In order to be 
actionable, the harassment must be so severe or pervasive 
that it alters the conditions of the victim's employment and 
creates an abusive environment. Id.  at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The proper analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the 
protections of the two acts interchangeably. See, e.g., Smith v. Pathmark 
Stores, Inc., No. 97-1561, 1998 WL 309916, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 
1998) (interpreting the two statutes concurr ently in a sexual harassment 
case); Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 885 F.Supp. 694, 714 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (same in racial discrimination cases). 
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2405; see also Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F .3d 439, 446-47 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367 
(1993), the Supreme Court clarified the elements of a 
discrimination claim resulting from a hostile work 
environment. In order to fall within the purview of Title VII, 
the conduct in question must be severe and pervasive 
enough to create an "objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment -- an environment that a r easonable person 
would find hostile -- and an environment the victim- 
employee subjectively perceives as abusive or hostile." Id. at 
21-22, 114 S.Ct. at 370-71. In determining whether an 
environment is hostile or abusive, we must look at 
numerous factors, including "the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere of fensive utterance; 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 
performance." Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. The Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed Harris' "severe and pervasive" test 
in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 783, 119 
S.Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998), and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 724, 732, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). 
 
After the Supreme Court's Faragher/Ellerth  decisions, 
employers must do more that merely take corrective action 
to remedy a hostile work environment situation. Employers 
also have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual harassment 
by supervisors. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793, 118 S.Ct. at 
2293; Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 561 
(6th Cir. 1999). Although the Supreme Court has not 
addressed hostile work environment claims arising from the 
actions of a co-worker, we have developed a framework for 
evaluating such a claim: 
 
       Five constituents must converge to bring a successful 
       claim for a sexually hostile work environment under 
       Title VII: (1) the employee suffer ed intentional 
       discrimination because of their sex, (2) the 
       discrimination was pervasive and regular , (3) the 
       discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) 
       the discrimination would detrimentally affect a 
       reasonable person of the same sex in that position, and 
       (5) the existence of respondeat superior  liability. 
 
                                7 
  
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (footnote and citations omitted); accord Kunin v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
B. Hostile Work Environment Harassment and Merithew's 
Actions 
 
In dismissing his complaint, the District Court 
determined that Weston could not establish a prima facie 
hostile work environment claim based on the PDOC's 
failure to adequately reprimand Merithew. It concluded that 
the alleged discrimination was not pervasive, r egular, or 
objectively detrimental, and that respondeat superior 
liability did not apply. 
 
Weston alleged in his complaint that the PDOC was liable 
for Merithew's harassment because it failed to pr event her 
from assaulting him and did not adequately discipline her. 
This argument has no merit. Our rule "envisions prompt 
remedial action when the hostile environment is 
discovered." Bouton v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 29 F.3d 
103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994). In other wor ds, when the source of 
the alleged harassment is a co-worker, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the employer failed to provide a 
reasonable avenue for complaint, or, if the employer was 
aware of the alleged harassment, that it failed to take 
appropriate remedial action. Kunin, 175 F.3d at 293 (citing 
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486 (liability exists where the 
defendant knew or should have known of the harassment 
and failed to take prompt remedial action)); see also 29 
C.F.R. S 1604.11(d)(1999) (employer is liable for co-worker 
harassment if it knows or should have known of the 
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and 
appropriate corrective action.); Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 
F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 
Under our jurisprudence, the PDOC's failure to prevent 
an act of co-worker harassment, in and of itself, does not 
end the hostile environment inquiry. After W eston officially 
complained about Merithew's conduct, she received a 
written reprimand for violating the PDOC's policies against 
sexual harassment. Weston does not allege that the 
offensive conduct continued after the r eprimand. We have 
instructed that "an effective grievance pr ocedure -- one 
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that is known to the victim and that timely stops the 
harassment -- shields the employer from T itle VII liability 
for hostile environment." Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110. Moreover, 
when an employer's response stops the harassment, there 
can be no employer liability under Title VII. Kunin, 175 
F.3d at 294 ("By definition, ther e is no negligence if the 
[sexual harassment grievance] procedur e is effective.") 
(citing Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110). The PDOC's grievance 
procedure was obviously known to W eston (he filed a 
complaint) and, by his own admission, it was ef fective. 
Liability cannot be imputed to the PDOC for Merithew's 
conduct or for its alleged failure to adequately reprimand 
her. 
 
C. Hostile Work Environment and the Comments, Jokes, 
       and Jibes of Co-workers, Managers and Inmates 
 
Weston's complaint averred that the PDOC should be 
held liable for the comments, jokes, and jibes of inmates. In 
Slayton v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Serv., 206 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 
2000), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir cuit determined 
that, without more, objectionable conduct by prison 
inmates cannot, in and of itself, be a sufficient predicate for 
a hostile work environment claim. Id. W e agree that 
"prisoners, by definition, have breached prevailing societal 
norms in fundamentally corrosive ways. By choosing to 
work in a prison, corrections personnel have acknowledged 
and accepted the probability that they will face 
inappropriate and socially deviant behavior ." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
However, this is not an absolute rule. Prison liability for 
inmate conduct may indeed apply when, for example, the 
institution fails to take appropriate steps to remedy or 
prevent illegal inmate behavior. See id.; Waymire v. Harris 
County, Tex., 86 F.3d 424, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that because prison took prompt remedial action, jailer did 
not establish a hostile environment wher e a fellow jailer 
circulated sexually offensive inmate drawing). Moreover, we 
can find no authority which suggests that ther e is an 
absolute bar to Title VII liability when prison personnel 
encourage or instigate illegal inmate behavior . 
 
Weston's complaint indicates that he was subjected to 
comments, jokes, and jibes by unspecified inmates. 
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Complaint at P 18. Absent further amplification -- for 
instance that prison officials encouraged the inmate's 
comments, or that prison officials knew of the harassing 
conduct but failed to remedy it -- this mer e allegation is 
insufficient to state a Title VII claim. However, Weston 
should have an opportunity to amend his complaint so as 
to make allegations, if possible, as to prison officials' 
instigation and/or knowledge of these events. W e believe 
the District Court erred in not providing Weston an 
opportunity to amend his complaint in this fashion. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 
2000); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 
1976). We reverse the District Court and remand with 
instructions to grant Weston a specified period of time in 
which to amend the complaint. 
 
Weston's second basis for employer liability is more 
complex. In his complaint, Weston alleges that he was 
subjected to "sexually offensive comments, jokes and jibes 
by fellow PDOC employees, managers and inmates." 
Complaint at P 18. On appeal, he has ar gued that the 
PDOC is liable for the jokes of its managers and W eston's 
co-workers because of the PDOC's negligent r esponse to 
these comments. His central argument is that the jokes, 
jibes, and comments continued unabated, ther eby creating 
a hostile work environment. 
 
While the Supreme Court has stated that T itle VII grants 
employees "the right to work in an environment free from 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult," Meritor 
Savs. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, it has 
likewise emphasized that not all workplace conduct that 
has sexual overtones can be characterized as forbidden 
harassment. See id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405-06. The 
alleged harassment must affect a "ter m, condition or 
privilege" of employment in order to fall within Title VII's 
purview. Id. Moreover, the Supr eme Court has instructed 
that a plaintiff must allege that the conduct at issue was 
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but 
actually constituted gender discrimination. See Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S.Ct. 
998, 1002 (1998). The mere utterance of an epithet, joke, or 
inappropriate taunt that may cause offense does not 
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sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate 
Title VII liability. See Schwapp v. T own of Avon, 118 F.3d 
106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 
Weston's complaint includes little detail about the 
content of the offensive comments, jokes, and jibes. 
Instead, it merely claims that they wer e the result of 
Merithew's actions, and were made in retaliation for his 
filing of a grievance against her. See  Complaint at P 18. By 
his own admission, the comments, jokes, and jibes were 
not directed at his gender. In fact, W eston's complaint fails 
to allege that he was targeted because of his gender. See 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79, 118 S.Ct. at 1002. Furthermore, 
the complaint makes no allegation that the conduct altered 
the conditions of Weston's employment or cr eated an 
abusive environment in which he had to work. See Meritor 
Savs. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2505-06 (quoting 
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 9040 (11th Cir. 
1982)). 
 
However, at oral argument, Weston's counsel argued that 
his allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss based on our liberal notice pleading r equirements. 
See FED. R. CIV. P . 8. Generally, in federal civil cases, a 
claimant does not have to set out in detail the facts upon 
which a claim is based, but must merely pr ovide a 
statement sufficient to put the opposing party on notice of 
the claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 
248, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co., 144 
F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 1998). In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957), the Supreme Court set out 
the proper role of pleadings: 
 
       The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
       claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he 
       bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require 
       is a short and plain statement of the claim that will 
       give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintif f's 
       claim is and the grounds upon which it r ests. Such 
       simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the 
       liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pr etrial 
       procedures established by the Rules to disclose more 
       precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to 
       define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. 
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       The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is 
       a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be 
       decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that 
       the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a pr oper decision 
       on the merits.  
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Universe Tankships, Inc. v. 
United States, 528 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir . 1975) (notice 
pleading requires a party only to "disclose adequate 
information as the basis of his claim for r elief."); Quinones 
v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[A] 
complaint should not be dismissed for failur e to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief"). 
 
Dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is inappropriate 
because Weston's complaint states a claim for hostile work 
environment and therefore provides adequate notice to the 
defense. Although Weston's allegations ar e not strong, they 
are nonetheless sufficient to meet our lenient standards of 
notice pleading. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 
F.3d 1000, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000). Complaints "need not 
plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory." 
Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 
1998)); see also Powell v. Ridge, 189 F .3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 
1999); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless 
P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[A] plaintiff 
need not allege all the facts necessary to pr ove its claim."); 
Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) ("A complaint . . . need not allege all that a 
plaintiff must eventually prove . . ."); Gooding v. Warner- 
Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354, 357-59 (3d Cir . 1984) 
(eschewing "highly technical pleading rules, which only 
serve to trap the unwary practitioner," in favor of notice 
pleading;) accord Sinclair v. Kleindienst , 711 F.2d 291, 293 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not require a claimant to set out the pr ecise facts on which 
the claim is based . . . . `Notice pleading' is sufficient."); 
Williams v. Washington Metro. Ar ea Transit Auth., 721 F.2d 
1412, 1418 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fouche v. Jekyll Island- 
State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 
                                12 
  
Discrimination and other civil rights claims ar e clearly 
subject to notice pleading. Conley involved a class action by 
African-American railroad clerks who alleged that their 
union had breached its duty of fair repr esentation and 
discriminated against them in violation of the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. S 151. In reversing the Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme Court r ejected 
defendant's argument that dismissal was pr oper because 
"the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its 
general allegations of discrimination." Conley, 355 U.S. at 
47, 78 S.Ct. at 99. Thirty-five years later , in Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County, the Court reaffir med Conley and rejected 
the suggestion that a " `heightened pleading standard' -- 
more stringent than the usual pleading r equirements of 
Rule 8(a)--" should apply in civil rights cases. 507 U.S. at 
164, 167-68, 113 S.Ct. at 1160-62. 
 
Therefore, although we question the merits of Weston's 
claim for hostile work environment due to the comments, 
jokes, and jibes of his co-workers and managers, he has 
satisfied the extremely lenient requir ement of notice 
pleading. We will reverse the District Court and remand 
that portion of the case with instructions to per mit further 
discovery. 
 
We note that, at this stage of the litigation, Weston does 
not present the most compelling of Title VII hostile work 
environment claims. Were this an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, we would be hard-pressed to reverse a 
disposition in PDOC's favor. However, this is an appeal from 
a 12(b)(6) dismissal and, although we consider the question 
to be an extremely close one, we conclude that Weston's 
allegations of a hostile work environment cr eated by the 
remarks of co-workers and managers suffices to state a 
Title VII claim. 
 
III. Summary Judgment - The Retaliation Claim 
 
To establish a prima facie case of r etaliation, a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a pr otected 
employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse 
employment action after or contemporaneous with the 
protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the 
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protected activity and the adverse action. See Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 297 (3d Cir. 2000); 
see also, e.g., Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 
173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997); Krouse v. American Sterilized Co., 
126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the third 
requirement as a "causal connection"); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 
873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
It is undisputed that Weston's sexual harassment 
complaint to his supervisor on February 15, 1997, and his 
similar inquiries on February 26, March 26, and April 25 
were protected activities. See DiIenno v. Goodwill Indus. of 
Mid-Eastern Pennsylvania, 162 F.3d 235, 236 (3d Cir. 
1998). Moreover, his filing of a complaint with the Equal 
Opportunity Employment Commission on July 16, 1997, 
was also protected. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The District Court identified four adverse employment 
actions, the second element of a prima facie case. First, 
Weston suffered two suspensions without pay in June and 
August of 1998. It is not disputed that these suspensions 
were adverse employment actions. However , the parties 
disagree on whether the written reprimands on March 3, 
1997, and May 15, 1997, can be similarly characterized. 
We have specifically found oral reprimands not sufficiently 
adverse to qualify under the statute. See Robinson, 120 
F.3d at 1301 (holding that unsubstantiated oral reprimands 
and unnecessary derogatory comments wer e not adverse 
employment actions in a retaliatory conduct case). The 
District Court, however, found Weston's written reprimands 
distinguishable from oral reprimands and therefore held 
that they were adverse employment actions. In the 
circumstances of this case, we disagree. 
 
A. The Written Reprimands 
 
Title VII specifically prohibits action which would "deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee." 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a). The Supr eme Court has 
defined a tangible, adverse employment action as a 
"significant change in employment status, such as hiring, 
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firing, failing to promote, reassignment, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus. 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2268 
(1998). In the context of this case, Weston must show, 
among other things, that these written reprimands affected 
the terms or conditions of his employment. 
 
The District Court believed that Weston satisfied this 
burden because the reprimands in question were written 
instead of oral. Additionally, the District Court stressed 
that the reprimands were placed in W eston's personnel file 
for a period of six months.4 The District Court found that 
these reprimands rose to a level serious enough to trigger 
employer liability because of their "presumed" effect on 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of Weston's 
employment. 
 
We conclude, however, that Weston failed to establish 
how these two reprimands effect a material change in the 
terms or conditions of his employment. W e cannot, 
therefore, characterize them as adverse employment 
actions. Weston's own deposition testimony indicates that 
he was not demoted in title, did not have his work schedule 
changed, was not reassigned to a differ ent position or 
location in the prison, did not have his hours or work 
changed or altered in any way, and that he was not denied 
any pay raise or promotion as a result of these reprimands. 
Additionally, the reprimands were of a temporary nature. 
Because they were not permanently affixed to Weston's 
employment file, we cannot see how they changed or 
altered his employment status in any way. Mor eover, 
Weston suffered no reduction in pay, reassignment, firing, 
or any similar employment action. Hence, we focus on 
whether there was a causal connection between W eston's 
protected activity and the two suspensions without pay that 
he received on June 12, 1998 and July 31, 1998. We note 
that the burden of establishing such a connection falls 
upon Weston. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 279. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At oral argument, counsel for the PDOC confirmed this practice and 
additionally noted that although a written r eprimand may remain in a 
correction officer's employment file longer than six months, a collective 
bargaining agreement prohibits the PDOC from using or making 
reference to any such reprimand older than six months. 
 
                                15 
  
B. Causation 
 
On appeal, Weston presents several ar guments that there 
was sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection 
between the filing of his complaints and his two 
suspensions. Initially, he argues that the timing of these 
events suggests a connection between his complaints and 
the adverse employment actions taken against him. W ith 
one exception, we have never held that timing alone can be 
sufficient to establish causation.5 We conclude that the 
timing in this case is not unusual enough to become a 
causal link.6 
 
The one-day and three-day suspensions, which W eston 
received in the summer of 1998, were mor e than a year 
distant from his protected activities. Absent other evidence, 
we cannot infer causation. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504 (a 
nineteen month interlude between the protected activity 
and the alleged retaliation, without any other evidence of 
discriminatory animus in the interim, was insufficient as a 
matter of law to support an inference of causation). 
 
Next, Weston argues that the District Court erred by not 
considering a "pattern of antagonism," which he believes 
was evident throughout the entire course of events. Weston 
relies on our opinion in Kachmar, wher e we held it was 
improper for the District Court not to consider evidence 
establishing such a pattern. 109 F.3d at 177. Kachmar is 
not relevant to Weston's claims. In Kachmar, retaliatory 
termination occurred one year after the protected action. 
See id. at 177. Throughout the intervening year however, 
there were numerous circumstances that suggested 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), we found 
that 
an employee's dismissal two days after the company learned of his EEOC 
complaint was sufficiently persuasive evidence to satisfy the causation 
element of a prima facie case. Our holding in Jalil, however, is limited 
to 
the unusually suggestive facts of that case, which are not present in this 
appeal. 
 
6. We need not consider Weston's EEOC complaint. He does not argue 
that the PDOC was aware of this filing. See Jones v. School Dist. of 
Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir . 1999) (requiring that the party 
responsible for the adverse conduct be awar e of the protected activity 
before causation can be inferred). 
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termination might occur, including statements that the 
plaintiff was off the management track and that she should 
start looking for another job. See id. at 178. We concluded 
that the cumulative effect revealed a pattern of antagonism, 
which overcame any doubts raised by the temporal 
separation of events. Thus, we held that causation had 
been established. Unlike Kachmar, the alleged pattern of 
antagonism in this case did not portend any futur e 
retaliation. Instead, the adverse employment actions were 
discrete responses to particular occurr ences. Whereas a 
pattern of antagonism was clear on the facts in Kachmar, 
there is no evidence in this case that the PDOC's actions 
were related. 
 
Weston also argues that a causal connection can be 
established by the inconsistent explanations the PDOC 
provided for its reprimands. Inconsistent explanations can 
be an alternative method for establishing a causal link 
between a protected activity and adverse employment 
actions. See Waddell v. Small Tube Pr ods., Inc., 799 F.2d 
73, 77 (3d Cir. 1986). Weston contends that the PDOC gave 
inconsistent accounts of whether other kitchen employees 
had attendance records similar to W eston's. His argument 
is unclear. Assuming arguendo that an inconsistency exists, 
it still does not establish a causal connection because 
Weston's two adverse employment actions wer e unrelated to 
his attendance record. 
 
Weston argues that the District Court erred by not 
considering whether the PDOC's proffer ed explanations for 
the adverse employment actions were a pr etext for 
retaliation. Typically, pretext evidence is considered after a 
prima face case is established and the defendant 
has produced non-discriminatory or non-r etaliatory 
explanations for that behavior. See Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. 
Co. 88 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the familiar 
McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting dichotomy applies to 
retaliation claims). 
 
Weston is correct that pretext evidence can be relevant to 
causation. See Farrell, 206 F .3d at 287. As such, he argues 
that his two 1998 suspensions -- justified by the PDOC as 
discipline for attendance problems -- wer e imposed in 
retaliation for his sexual harassment complaint. The 
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PDOC's explanations, the argument continues, were 
pretextual. Such pretext, he maintains, evidences the 
PDOC's motivation, which is directly relevant to causation. 
In support of this position, he claims that other similarly 
situated officers were not disciplined. 
 
Weston's argument that the "attendance" justifications for 
his suspensions were pretextual fails. First, Weston does 
not dispute that his poor attendance was a valid r eason for 
the discipline he received. He merely ar gues that he was 
treated unfairly -- that he was punished while other 
culinary service officers with the same attendance problems 
were not. However, as the District Court noted, there were 
at least four employees dismissed for attendance pr oblems 
during the same period of time. In addition, the decisions 
to suspend Weston were not made by his immediate 
supervisor to whom he directed his sexual harassment 
complaints. Although Weston's supervisor did play a role in 
the suspensions, the suspensions were ultimately decided 
upon by a panel of three hearing officers. 7 Thus, retaliatory 
animus, whether for purposes of establishing causation or 
pretext, cannot be ascribed to the hearing officers who 
made the suspension determination. See  Jones v. School 
Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(affirming a grant of summary judgment in a retaliation 
claim on the basis that the responsible persons had no 
information about the underlying protected discrimination 
claim). 
 
Weston simply cannot create a genuine issue of material 
fact that his suspensions were imposed in r etaliation for his 
sexual harassment claims. He cannot establish causation 
or pretext. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In summation, we will reverse that portion of the District 
Court's dismissal of Weston's complaint as to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Neither party addresses whether those hearing officers were aware of 
Weston's sexual harassment complaints. However, the PDOC does 
represent that the hearing officers wer e unaware of Weston's EEOC 
filing. 
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allegations that the comments, jokes, and jibes of his co- 
workers and managers created a hostile work environment 
for which the PDOC would be liable, and we r emand the 
cause for further discovery and proceedings. W ith regard to 
that portion of Weston's complaint containing allegations 
that comments, jokes, and jibes of inmates cr eated a hostile 
work environment, we reverse the District Court and 
remand with instructions to grant Weston a specified period 
of time in which to amend the complaint. We affirm the 
District Court's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of 
Weston's complaint against the PDOC in all other respects. 
 
We likewise affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the PDOC on Weston's r etaliation 
claims. 
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